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THE CORPORATE MACHINERY FOR HEARING 
AND HEEDING NEW VOICES 
A Panel Discussion* 
MR. RICHARD J. FARRELL: First of all, as moderator of this 
panel, I am going to presume to respond on behalf of the panel in its 
entirety to your introductions, and remind them, after those rather 
generous references you have made, of the fellow who was basking in 
the warm reflected light of his introduction at an after-dinner speech, 
and, on the way home, turned to his wife and said, "Dear, you know, 
isn't it striking that there are so few leaders in this business of ours!" 
And she said, "Yes, my dear - and there's just one fewer than you 
think!" 
This subject, as we have been reminded a time or two today, is one 
that's caught the public fancy. It seems a very current thing, yet it has 
been commented on many times before. I was struck recently, in finish- 
ing a book I'd been at for some time, with some of the concluding 
observations made by Sir Kenneth Clark in his work on "Civilisation." 
I think many of you saw it produced on our NET television, although 
it was earlier popularized on the BBC. In the concluding paragraphs of 
his commentary, Sir Kenneth says two things I thought were worthy 
of quotation, here: 
"Well, one doesn't need to be young to dislike institutions. But 
the dreary fact remains that, even in the darkest ages, it was insti- 
tutions that made society work, and if civilisation is to survive, 
society must somehow be made to work." 
And, in the very final paragraph of his book, that: 
"The trouble is that there is still no centre. The moral and the 
intellectual failure of Marxism has left us with no alternative to 
heroic materialism and that isn't enough. One may be optimistic, 
but one can't exactly be joyful at the prospect before us." 
So, our contemporary subject is one of great importance, but it 
certainly isn't very new, as we were reminded at lunch by Mr. Lund- 
borg, and, in reflecting on this characteristic ofthe problem, I thought 
it might be of interest to look back at some commentaries I recalled 
from law school. In the Thirties, up in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Professor Dodd and Professor Berle got into a colloquy on the subject, 
* Panelists were: John R. Bunting, Philadelpnia, Pennsylvania, President, The 
First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Company; Professor Alfred F. Conard, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan; Professor Jan Deutsch, New Haven, Connecticut; Richard 
J. Farrell, Chicago, Illinois; Leon Hickman, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 
Editor's Note - These remarks were presented in a program of this Section in 
New York on July 6, 1971. 
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all of which is published in the May and June 1932 issues of the 
Harvard Law Review. 
Professor Dodd started all this by making some observations tothe 
effect that he thought business had some social responsibility, and he 
painted some background in his first article by quoting from one of the 
old English cases - Lord Bowen, in 1887, in Hutton v. Westcourt Rail- 
road, to this effect: 
"The law, being reflected inthe state, the law does not say that 
there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and 
ale except such as are required for th^e benefit of the company." 
And, I guess that's pretty good law, perhaps, right down to today. 
But, Professor Dodd took issue with that, and said: 
"If business is tending to become a profession, then a corporate 
person engaged in business is a professional, even though its stock- 
holders, taking no active part in the conduct of the business, may 
not be. Those through whom it acts, therefore, may employ its 
funds in a manner appropriate to a person practicing a profession 
and imbued with a sense of social responsibility, without thereby 
being guilty of a breach of trust." 
This clearly raised some hackles on Mr. Berle's neck, and he re- 
sponded at length. In summing up he had this to say: 
"It is likely, the claims upon corporate wealth and corporate 
income will be asserted from jnany directions. The shareholder, 
who now has a primary property right of a residual income after 
expenses are met, may ultimately be conceived of as having an 
equal participation with a number of other claimants, or he may 
emerge, still, with a primary property right over residual income 
but subordinated toa number of others, such as labor, customers, 
patrons and by the community, which would like to cut down on 
that residue. It would,' as Professor Dodd points out, 'be un- 
fortunate oleave the law in such shape that these developments 
could not be recognized asj a matter of institutional or corporation 
law. But it is one thing to say that the law must allow for such 
developments; it is quite another to grant uncontrolled power to 
corporate managers in the hope they will produce that develop- 
ment.' " 
I think it is fair to say that we have not resolved that controversy, 
at this point in time. 
We thought we'd start his afternoon with our two members from 
academia, because great ideas usually do generate in the academic om- 
munity, it taking a while for them to filter down. It's my conviction, 
most of the ideas moving the world are generated somewhere in the 
academic community. 
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In order to give us some background against which to perhaps best 
test some of the propositions, we are very fortunate to have both 
Professors Conard and Deutsch with us today, and will start with Al 
Conard, who will, I think, as he has indicated, try to give us some 
semblance of an understanding of approaches to this problem, some 
of which may seem foreign to us - they come from other parts of the 
world- but approaches which perhaps have worked pretty well. 
Al, would you take the podium? 
PROFESSOR ALFRED F. CONARD: We are invited today to 
consider the ways in which "new voices" can be made more audible in 
the corporate auditorium. By new voices is meant, I suppose, voices 
other than those of the shareholders. There is a certain irony in this, 
since a good deal of the scholarship of the last forty ears - dating from 
the seminal work of Berle and Means - has been devoted to showing 
that managers do not even hear or heed the voices of shareholders. An 
effective oice for shareholders might be as new as any other. But I 
will play the game according to the rules, and assume that shareholders 
are an old voice, to which some new ones should be added. 
What are these new voices that ought to be listened to? Obvious can- 
didates for attention are laborers who work in the company, and con- 
sumers who buy its products. However, a good deal of the current 
demand for change is directed toward a louder voice in defense of air, 
water, and that mysterious something or nothing called ether, which 
bears waves of light, heat, and television, to mention only the basic 
necessities. Naturally, there are a number of eager candidates for the 
job of representing oxygen and ether, not to mention egrets, grizzly 
bears and coyotes. It's an attractive job, because when the coyotes 
howl, you can always ay, "Listen to the support I'm getting from my 
constituency." In order to escape the ambiguity in the voice of the 
constituency, I think it is better to view the constituency as constituted 
by those human beings who share the same air, water, and ether as the 
corporation, even if they are neither investors in it, workers for it, nor 
customers of it. They might be called the cohabitants - those who co- 
habit with the corporation i  the same hydrosphere. A few years ago, 
I would not have used so coarse a word as "cohabit" in a dignified meet- 
ing like this, but Hair has dulled my sensibilities. 
If we are to think about the interests of cohabitants, I think we 
should include not only those who are affected by the changes in the 
content of the air, the water, and the ether, but also those who con- 
tribute to and draw from the same tax fund. Speaking as an employee 
of a State, a very large part of whose income depends on the income 
of General Motors, I feel that I have a much more direct interest in the 
policies of that company than do many of its shareholders. 
Although laborers, consumers and cohabitants have been the group 
chiefly mentioned as deserving a new hearing for their voices, there 
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are at least two other groups which have a very immediate interest 
which is not reflected in the present structure of corporations. These 
are the lenders and the vendors - the people who supply the money 
and the goods on which the corporation operates. 
The question before us is how we are to hear these new voices. The 
idea we hear on every hand is to give a seat on the General Motors 
board to Ralph Nader Associates, or to the Medical Committee on 
Human Rights, or the Sierra Club - or one seat to each. This would 
doubtless still the clamor for a while. But if we are sincerely interested 
in helping the consumers and cohabitants, we should probably ask 
ourselves whether we are putting our money on the best horse. After 
all, shareholders have had up to now the right to name all the directors, 
and most people agree that their voice is very weak and squeaky. So 
maybe we ought to analyze more carefully what effects we are seeking 
to achieve, and what processes are likely to achieve them. 
If we are to offer a constructive solution to this problem, we have 
to separate the possible means from the probable ends. From the view- 
point of a professional representative of consumer or cohabitant in- 
terests, perhaps obtaining a General Motors directorship is itself an 
objective. It furnishes him with a nice income, a platform from whidi 
to speak, and possibly, resources for further propaganda. However, 
viewing the matter from the viewpoint of laborers, consumers, co- 
habitants, lenders, and vendors, the ultimate aim is not to get a director- 
ship for Ralph Nader, but to change the behavior of General Motors in 
a way which will be more beneficial to these groups. 
The Decisional Process 
If we are going to think about how to change the decisional process 
in General Motors and other corporations so as to alter the input of 
information a d motivation, we have to start by thinking how General 
Motors works today. One thing which will not help tis very much is to 
look at the Delaware statute, which tells us that the board of directors 
shall manage the affairs of the corporation, unless otherwise provided 
in the charter. As Orval Sebring remarked in some of the correspon- 
dence preparatory to this colloquium, it is patently impossible to carry 
out the statutory injunction. As a general rule of human organization, 
we can say that for every ten operatives (and usually less) there will 
be a person who supervises and directs - in short, manages. If General 
Motors has 700,000 employees, it has at least 70,000 managers, every 
one of whom makes decisions affecting labor, consumers and co- 
habitants. 
Many critics will be more particularly interested inwho decided to 
provide a 400-horsepower high-compression engine for a small Chev- 
rolet car. This decision is not made in the board of directors, and will 
not be, even if Ralph Nader sits there. Somewhere in the products plan- 
ning division a possible high-performance car is outlined, and the pro- 
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posai is forwarded to body designers, engineers, and market analysts 
to develop and report on its feasibility. Their reports probably point 
to a decision which nearly everyone would make - if he were dependent 
on the same reports. At the same time as the engine decision is being 
made, scores of other environmentally significant decisions are being 
made about the brakes, the tires, the body shape, the model name, the 
paint options, and the sales pitch with which the automobile is to be 
presented to the public. Other people are making important decisions 
about the location of new plants, the allocation of production tasks 
among facilities, the disposals of wastes at different plants, and all sorts 
of other decisions affecting consumers and cohabitants. Not one of 
these decisions comes before the board of directors. 
Changing the Inputs 
With this view of the decisional process and its dispersion through 
thousands of different employees, we are ready to take the next step 
in asking how to give the new voices a bigger share of the input into 
General Motors decisions. There are five principal ways of affecting 
this input. 
The first and most important way to affect decisions in any enterprise 
- large or small, public or private - is to change the thinking of the 
great mass of Americans who fill the management positions, which in 
General Motors are roughly estimated at 75,000. Nothing will re- 
orient company policy so much as having the American people environ- 
ment-conscious, because that is the only way to make sure that every 
designer, engineer, advertising copywriter, and foreman is thinking 
more about the environment. This is the modicum of sense behind 
Charles Reich's "Consciousness III," which says we have to change 
the minds of men before we can change the world. It is only a new 
application of a principle enunciated by now forgotten best-sellers such 
as Jesus Christ and Rabbi Hillel. Today, when all Americans have be- 
come environment-conscious, we can be sure that GM managers are, 
too. A few years ago, it was considered good citizenship for corpora- 
tions to hire well-educated, church-going, monogamous, golf-playing 
types, and they did. Now we think they have an obligation to hire drop- 
outs, addicts, convicts and other social rejects, and they do. 
However, there are quite a number of situations in which general 
education doesn't help at all. Monopoly and restraint of trade are 
examples. The more the managers are educated, the more they recog- 
nize the benefits to themselves and their company of monopoly and 
price fixing. Neither does anyone advocate putting representatives of 
the Attorney General on the board. To restrain monopoly and restraint 
of law, we rely on the force of law. The same approach is appropriately 
used to control the adulteration of foods and drugs, and their correct 
labeling. This may prove to be the most effective, or perhaps the only 
effective, way of protecting environmental interests. 
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A third method of changing institutional behavior is disruption, rang- 
ing from ordinary strikes - which have progressed from a crime to a 
civil right - to boycotts and sit-ins. Tfyis is the historic means of obtain- 
ing change in the terms of labor, and has recently emerged in colleges 
as a means of changing terms of admission, curriculum, and grading. 
The leverage potential of disruption and bargaining depends a good 
deal upon the tightness of organization of the group. If automobile 
dealers, for example, were legally free to organize a boycott of auto- 
mobile manufacturers, they could probably achieve very quick and 
spectacular results. Realism forces us to recognize that the purely 
passive aspects of disruption are usually supplemented by more violent 
ones. Although strikes consist most visibly of the non-working of union 
members, and their "peaceful picketing," the tensions of the situation 
are likely to produce the throwing of bricks through windows and the 
slashing of tires; we can expect disruption in the consumer or environ- 
mental area to present some of the sape trimmings. Some current at- 
tempts at disruption to advance environmental goals include billboard 
chopping, and dumping large collections of bottles in the foyers of 
bottling company offices. 
A fourth method of influencing corporate behavior is the representa- 
tion of the new voices in the corporate structure - presumably by the 
power to appoint officers or directors. This is the primary focus of to- 
day's discussion. As we consider its pros and cons, we must constantly 
ask ourselves not only whether it is good or bad, but whether it is 
better or worse than other alternatives which seem to be available. 
Let us now consider the appointment of representatives of labor, or 
of consumers, or of some group of cohabitants on the board of directors 
and imagine what effects that might be expected to have on corporate 
behavior. 
Consequences - Pluses and Minuses 
One thing I am sure of. There will be some desired effects, and 
some undesired effects, and in the biggest sector no effects at all. Let 
me talk first about the no-effeçt sector. I feel pretty confident about 
this one, since the shareholders have had all the voices for the last 
hundred years, and each year they seem to have less effect on how the 
directors act, and even on who they are. 
Is there any reason to think that the new voices would be louder 
than the old ones? Coincidentally, the modern world offers a remark- 
able experiment in new voices, which is labor representation in the 
supervisory council of German corporations. Most of the observers 
seem to think that it has had very little effect, and no one claims that 
its consequences are clearly discernible. 
The ineffectiveness ofthe shareholder voice has sometimes been at- 
tributed to some kind of a conspiracy of the managers to insulate 
themselves from true responsibility, but I think we may be dealing 
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with a more fundamental aspect of human organization. If you have 
75,000 different people making decisions, you can't do very much just 
by changing 3 of the top 30. Even if you reach pretty far down in the 
organization and insert new faces, they will be confronted with reports 
from the same old designers, engineers, and market analysts, so they 
will make the same decisions. The phenomenon is particularly well 
known in the federal government, where administrations succeçd one 
another with promises to make all kinds of revolutions in our foreign 
policy, our defense policy and in social security, but the government 
seems to go on its same glacial way. Look at Vietnam. 
Let us look, however, at a brighter side - the desirable results which 
might flow from new voices on the board. 
One possibility is that the mere presence of a laborers' or consumers' 
or cohabitants' representative on the board will dramatize the cor- 
poration's concern with interests other than those of the management, 
so that designers and engineers and copywriters throughout the com- 
pany will have a little more "Consciousness III." It may give courage 
to an environment-conscious designer, just as the presence of a black 
man on the board may give some supervisor more courage to appoint 
a black man as a production foreman. 
Beyond this symbolic effect, there is a possibility that the new voice 
on the board will call attention to consumer-oriented orenvironmental 
factors in company decisions, leading other directors to be more con- 
scious of them than they would otherwise be. I think this effect will be 
pretty small in General Motors, because I don't think the General 
Motors board of directors spends much time debating the size of the 
afterburner or even the compression ratio of the engines. 
Probably the proponents of new-voice representation on the board 
aspire to more positive effects than either of these. They want to swing 
the vote in their own direction. This assumes either that they hold a 
majority of the seats, or that the board already has a large minority 
of actual or potential insurgents who can be catalyzed into action by 
a few leaders from the new voice. Neither of these assumptions is 
sufficiently probable to merit much further thought. 
The only hypothesis on which one of the new voices might expect to 
have a voting impact would be if there were some other independent 
group with which they could combine. Suppose, for instance, that labor 
and consumers were each given one fourth of the votes; a small num- 
ber of votes for an environmental voice would suddenly acquire lever- 
age. 
Finally, let us look at the negative side - the undesired consequences 
which would or might result from new-voice representation. If we 
assume that the new-voice representatives will be completely ineffec- 
tive, this in itself will have some unfortunate consequences in that these 
representatives will take the place of other directors who might make 
affirmative contributions. 
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Another negative consequence would arise if the new-voice repre- 
sentatives, finding themselves in a hopeless minority, tried to force at- 
tention upon themselves by talking too loud and too much, and to 
obstruct other business in order to force attention on their own. More 
seriously, they might make hostile use of the information delivered to 
them as directors. Suppose for example that the company is considering 
a merger, which has some vulnerability to antitrust attack, but decides 
to go ahead anyway. The minority representatives may avail them- 
selves of the information to fuel government antitrust action, or share- 
holder derivative suits. 
If either obstructive tactics or the hostile use of information is em- 
ployed, the effect will be to denature the board of director's meetings 
by keeping serious discussion out of them. The main questions will be 
discussed and decided in executive committee meetings, and in cau- 
cuses. This type of operation will not kill the company, but it will 
probably make it less efficient, and will probably increase its tend- 
ency to pursue the narrowest of monetary objectives. 
Structuring for Positive Effects 
Given the possibility of both positive and negative reactions to the 
representation of new voices, we are in a position to consider what 
structural arrangements are likely to favor the positive results and 
diminish the negative ones. 
The first requirement for any positive effect is that the new-voice 
representatives should be numerous enough to have some impact on 
voting. A single representative of consumer interests eems likely to do 
more harm than good; to escape evident futility, he would probably 
be driven to disruption. On the other hand, it does not seem wise to 
give a majority of the board to any one group such as consumers or 
laborers, which would only substitute one form of tyranny for another. 
A simple solution to this problem would be a tripartite board, a third 
of which were elected by shareholders, a third by labor, and a third 
by consumer representatives (for instance). One might go another 
direction by having one-third elected by shareholders, with other sixths 
elected respectively by lenders and vendors, by labor, by consumers, 
and by cohabitants. This would prevent the danger of any one group 
establishing tyranny while giving every group some chance of forming 
a coalition on vital issues. 
A second requirement of any effective representation would be to 
define the constituency in such a way that it is capable of mobilizing 
its interests. A good example of a constituency well able to mobilize 
itself is labor; it will be biased by the power of labor union leaders, but 
it will not be ineffective. Another constituency which would be well 
able to organize itself if given a chance is the lender-vendor combina- 
tion. These will be small in number, and will know what they want. 
The principal thing one can say about them - at least the lenders - is 
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that they are well able to take care of themselves, even without struc- 
tural representation. 
When we turn to consumers, we have a real problem. If we think of 
immediate customers, it is not so bad. For General Motors, these would 
be the dealers. They are well able to organize and be represented, if 
given the chance. I think they might have some beneficial interests in 
insisting on better warranty service, and greater emphasis on product 
liability. The representation f immediate customers would be even 
more beneficial in basic industries like coal and steel, where the big 
users are sophisticated and powerful, and definitely interested inlower 
prices. 
On the other hand, neither representation is going to do a great deal 
for the ultimate consumer. Neither has a consuming interest in pro- 
ducing a cheaper, lighter car containing less steel, or one that won't 
rust out. 
To get the ultimate consumer effectively represented through any 
facsimile of the democratic process seems out of the question. To de- 
termine the collective will of General Motors consumers is only a 
little asier than finding the will of the population of the United States. 
We have some difficulty doing that even with 435 representatives and 
100 senators. Although Ralph Nader will doubtless offer, like General 
de Gaulle, to lead his people in this critical hour, who can tell whether 
they really prefer him to Jeffrey O'Connell, Virginia Knauer or Andy 
Granatelli? There are two realistic options. One is to let a government 
department ame representatives; another is to let the GM board co- 
opt them. 
If the representation of consumers i enigmatic, the representation 
of cohabitants i utterly impenetrable. Recent developments along the 
Connecticut River illustrate he conflict of interest between the down- 
stream and downwind cohabitants, and the cohabitants of the company 
town whose wages, tax base, and real estate values all depend on the 
survival of a plant. The only thing we can say for sure about the co- 
habitants of General Motors is that they live not only in Delaware, 
Michigan, and the United States, but also in Canada, Kamchatka, and 
Madagascar. Here again, we cannot alk about representatives chosen 
by the concerned cohabitants, but only about representatives appointed 
by government or co-opted by the shareholder board to represent the 
designated interests. 
While we are giving our attention to the effective representation of 
the new voices, it would be only fair to do something about the tradi- 
tionally ineffective representation of the old voice - that of the share- 
holders. If investors' interests are to be effectively expressed in the 
board of directors, it is important that brokers and institutional in- 
vestors hould be strongly encouraged by the government to exercise 
their own opinions about the interests of their customers. Although 
there is no law against vigorous position-taking byinvestment trusts 
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and brokerage firms, there are a number of regulations which discour- 
age their doing so. These were born of a legitimate fear of the financial 
fraternity exercising an undue influence on corporate policy. This fear 
was well based, so long as there were no other interests but shareholders 
represented, and the shareholders were too dispersed to protect them- 
selves. But if powerful voices of laborers and consumers were present, 
the danger of undue domination by financial interests would be well 
controlled; at the same time, it would be essential to give new vigor 
to the representation of shareholder interest, in order that they not be 
completely submerged by the more activist representatives of labor and 
consumers. Thus, we have the interesting possibility that the increased 
representation of new voices might actually increase the effectiveness 
of the representation of the old voice. 
This is not so surprising as it seems, and is related to the proposi- 
tion that the granting of increased power to one group does not neces- 
sarily reduce the power of another. It used to be thought that if labor 
had more control of working conditions, management would have less. 
Experience has shown that in many cases sharing control with labor 
means that both management and labor have more control than either 
had before. The reason why this is possible is because in a poorly 
organized situation there is no control by anyone. 
One may think about this paradox in terms of the ghetto, which is 
out of control of the police. One might think that by giving ghetto 
dwellers a voice in police command, the police control would diminish 
even further. On the contrary, the police control may increase, precisely 
because it is shared. In the same way, shareholder control of corpora- 
tions might be enhanced rather than diminished by effective sharing 
with labor and consumer interests. 
Finally, a third requirement for positive results is the possibility of 
finding some common ground between each "new voice" and the other 
voices - old or new. If one of the voices is eternally at odds with the 
majority, it will achieve nothing positive, and will only impair the 
effectiveness of the board. The "new voices" vary immensely in their 
potential for compatibility with other voices. 
To be more specific, the interests of laborers and shareholders in an 
enterprise are harmonious on many points. Both want the market for 
the product to expand, so that opportunities for profits and wage in- 
creases are enhanced. Both want to get more money from the consumer 
at a lesser expenditure. Both would suffer from losses in the competi- 
tive race, and from antitrust suits or other government interference. 
They differ chiefly on the rather narrow issue of how much of the 
gross income should be allocated to shareholders and how much to 
laborers. 
Similarly, lenders and vendors share with the shareholders a lively 
interest in the continuity of the enterprise and in its rake-off of money 
from customers. Neither lenders or vendors want the company to be 
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harassed by private or public law suits. 
When we turn to ultimate consumers, we have a more mixed picture. 
Unlike the immediate consumers (the dealers) , the ultimate consumers 
(or car owners) may have very little commitment o the survival of 
General Motors as an enterprise and might be expected to join in killing 
the goose that laid the golden egg. Presumably they would be quite 
pleased to obtain information which could be used in customer-class 
suits against the manufacturer, to put money in the pockets of dis- 
appointed car buyers. These hostile potentialities may be somewhat 
muted by the traditional loyalty of a user to the brand that he has 
bought, although it is unlikely that the loyal buyers will be the ones 
who become consumer representatives. 
When we turn to the cohabitants, we find the lowest possibility of 
common interests, and the highest possibility of antagonistic ones. 
There are probably many Sierra Club members who would like to see 
the private automobile perish in favor of railroad trains, canoes, bi- 
cycles, and hiking boots. Even among cohabitants less separated ideo- 
logically, there may be a gross incompatibility of interest. Undoubtedly 
the cohabitants of Dearborn would favor the continued health and 
wealth of the Ford Motor Company, but the cohabitants of Grosse 
Point and Windsor, who live down-wind from the blast furnaces, and 
mostly work for GM and Chrysler, might be quite happy to see Ford 
knuckle under. Thus, cohabitant representatives would have a minimum 
chance of finding a community of interest with the other voices, or even 
among themselves. Thwarted in any effort o exercise voting power, 
they would be almost forced to adopt destructive tactics. 
Restructuring the Board 
If we solve the problem of representing some or all of the new voices, 
we will stand face to face with the problem of ineffectiveness of the 
board itself. This was a problem before new voices were even men- 
tioned. Business Week for May 22, 1971, features a long report en- 
titled "The board: it's obsolete unless overhauled." 
The essential problem with the board is that it is trying to fulfill too 
many incompatible roles. Of these, two stand out. One is the "team 
role" in which the board works and thinks together to win the game 
according to the signals called by the president. The other is the "Senate 
role" in which the board members exercise maximum independence of 
thought in evaluating and criticizing the leadership, and advocating 
conflicting views on where the company should be going. The "inside" 
or officer members play chiefly the team role. If the outside members 
have a function other than an iconographie one - like the saints carved 
on the door of the baptistry - it is in the second role. Certainly the new 
voices would be expected to act in this way. 
In large companies, as everybody knows, the team role is almost 
abandoned because the board is too big, and the outside members are 
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not equipped to play it. As a result, all of the team work is done in the 
committees on finance, marketing, products planning, and so. The 
price we pay is that the whole body of team members has no huddle. 
It is like a football team where so many alumni crowd into the huddle, 
that it is no longer used for anything but shouts of "Yea, Wabash," 
and the only real huddles are the separate ones between interior line- 
men, ball carriers, and off by themselves, the split ends and flankers. 
The Senate role is also abandoned for a variety of reasons, one being 
that the team members - that is, the inside directors - don't want to 
play it. They want to show loyalty by backing up the quarterback. 
This incompatibility is already legendary, but it will become even 
more glaring as new voices are introduced into the board. If Ralph 
Nader or Jeffrey O'Connell gets on the General Motors board, you can 
bet that Roche is not going to put him on the executive committee for 
product planning. In fact, Roche will let even less information about 
product planning get to the board of directors than he does now. 
There is a solution to the problem, with which many American busi- 
nessmen are familiar because of their experience with subsidiaries in 
Germany, Austria, Japan, and France since 1966. It is the two^board 
system. There is an upper board, called the supervisory council, which 
contains only outsiders; company officers are ineligible. Then there is 
the lower board, commonly called the management board, which con- 
sists entirely of full-time officers of the company. The management 
board performs the team functions; it runs the company. The super- 
visory council performs the Senate role; it decides how well the man- 
agers are doing, and who should be promoted. They are categorically 
forbidden to meddle in the management of the company's day-to-day 
business. 
This arrangement has been developed over the past hundred years, 
long before there was any concern with new voices. Primarily it was 
a solution to the conflict-of-interest problem. The supervisory board 
passes on the conflict-of-interest questions affecting the managers, in- 
cluding their salaries and bonuses. The supervisory board themselves 
have very few conflicts of interest, because they do not participate in 
any of the operational decisions of the company. 
When the idea of labor participation in governance of companies - 
known as Mitbestimmung, or codetermination - came in after World 
War II, the supervisory council turned out to be a very handy device 
for permitting labor to have a voice without becoming involved in the 
active management. Since 1950, labor representatives have constituted 
one third of the supervisory council of the major German corporations, 
except in the coal and steel industries, where they constitute one half. 
There have been no end of studies of the institution of codetermina- 
tion, most of them rather inconclusive. Most observers have difficulty 
seeing that it has any consequences at all. The sharpest critics are those 
on the left who complain that it has lulled labor into passivity. One 
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thing sure: it has not destroyed private enterprise. West Germany to- 
day must be regarded as the world's best illustration of the vitality of 
capitalism today. This is pretty good evidence that codetermination is
not destructive of the capitalist system. 
The most impressive thing about the two-board system is that the 
rest of Europe is taking it over. When the French corporation law was 
completely rewritten in 1966 - for the first time in 99 years - they 
introduced the two-board system as an option in French corporations. 
They gave it a distinctive French flavor, by renaming the lower board 
the directoire - which reminds us of the beautiful clean-lined furniture 
of the early Napoleonic era. It is so much more elegant than the Ger- 
man Vorstand, which means the "front men." 
On June 30, 1970 - almost exactly a year ago - the executive com- 
mission of the European Communities ubmitted a proposed uniform 
law to govern interstate corporations within the Community, which will 
make the two-board system not optional but mandatory for all com- 
panies coming under the new law. They may or may not have co- 
determination; that is up to the various states. But they must have the 
two-board system. This does not prove that American corporation laws 
should adopt the system. If we have a system that is working well, and 
seems adaptable to the demands of new voices, we should stick with it. 
If, however, we have a system that is clumsy even when all the voices 
are the shareholders, and looks like it will work even worse when new 
voices are introduced, I think we should give sympathetic study to a 
model which has been proposed for our competitors across the Atlantic. 
Summary 
For the past thirty minutes, I have been pulling apart the engine of 
corporate management, looking at the pieces, and considering several 
alternative substitutions. Now let's pretend that we have a free choice 
of what we will put in as we rebuild the engine. 
I propose that we give the shareholders quite a few new bedfellows. 
I would cut in for equal shares the employees, the lenders and vendors, 
and the immediate customers. At the same time, I would give the big 
shareholders - institutional investors and the brokers - a lot of freedom 
and encouragement to exercise their franchise aggressively. All of these 
people would have voices in a supervisory council, which would not 
have anything to do with running the operations of the company, but 
would have everything to do with evaluating the managers, hiring and 
firing them, and raising or cutting their pay. I propose all of this, not 
with the intention of cutting down on the power of the shareholders, 
but in the belief that a livelier board will actually increase the power 
of the shareholders over the managers. And I think there will be far 
more areas of agreement than of difference among the union leaders, 
bankers, brokers, and dealers whose faces now show in the upper 
board's meetings. 
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However, I have left out the groups whose claim to participation is 
the subject of all the shouting- the ultimate consumers and the co- 
habitants. There are insuperable difficulties to these groups' selecting 
their own representatives; they will inevitably be represented by self- 
appointed champions, or by government appointees. Since some co- 
habitants' interests are in fundamental conflict with others, whatever 
representatives are appointed will misrepresent more constituents than 
they represent. 
Even if flawless representatives could be found, they might not do 
much good on the board of directors. They would immediately be at 
each other's throats to decide whether new factories hould be built in 
Mississippi to improve employment opportunities there, or kept out to 
preserve the silence of the bayous. The same argument that rages in 
Congress about bombing or not bombing in Vietnam would have to be 
debated in the directors' meetings of Dow Chemical and Olin 
Mathieson. 
Consequently, I am led to the conclusion that the consumers and 
cohabitants of General Motors will be better off urging their concerns 
in Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Office of Management and 
Budget - to name three principal branches of American government. 
At the same time, I do not predict ruin if consumer and environ- 
mental representatives are placed on boards. The presence of these 
invaders cannot do worse than confirm the boards in their present 
sterility, and perhaps hasten the day when American corporations turn 
to the European two-board system. Their presence may possibly en- 
courage the development of "Consciousness III" in the corporate hier- 
archy. 
In conclusion, I think that new voices in corporate structure are 
something that we cannot only live with; we may even live better with 
them. In view of the decrepitude of present boards of directors, we have 
less to lose than to gain by trying something new. 
PROFESSOR JAN DEUTSCH: Let me start talking about the cor- 
porate machinery for hearing and heeding new voices, by adding one 
fact to the introductions you have heard, that seems important to me, 
and that fact is that I did practice corporate law, as well as teach. Now, 
it may be that it's because of that that I like The Business Lawyer so 
much, but it's also because of that that I am very loath and always 
have been loath to discuss corporate machinery, as such. Too often, 
what corporate machinery should be depends on the size of the cor- 
poration, the nature of the business, the manner in which the enter- 
prise was founded. In addition, I have learned, as I have tried to teach 
students, that, usually, when one starts examining a corporate problem, 
one starts by looking to the statutory provisions. But, most corporation 
statutes are enabling acts, not complexes of guidelines or governing 
rules for difficult problems, and I think the hearing and heeding of new 
voices is a difficult problem. 
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I, myself, still think the most helpful place to look is that of the 
law of cases. That's why I'd like to do what I propose to do - identify 
three sets of new voices and use three cases that I hope are familiar 
to everyone - Dodge v. Ford Motor Company,1 Sylvia Martin Founda- 
tion v. Swearingen2 and Medical Committee for Human Rights v. 
Securities and Exchange Commission3 - to describe how the new voices 
have changed over time and how the law has changed as a result of 
hearing and heeding. 
There were at least three varieties of new voices about which I 
think there is a need for all of us to be concerned. First, those as- 
sociated in firms practicing corporate law and that portion of the 
new generation of corporate managers to whom questions of social 
responsibility and social activity seem far more important than they 
did to their predecessors. I know that our luncheon speaker was a 
predecessor, but I don't think, in that regard, he is very typical. Many 
corporations and law firms have already recognized the extent o which 
this class of new employees shifted the burden from business, and law 
students, to persuading firms they should be hired, to firms having to 
persuade those students that the students should come to work with 
them. Second, there is the growth of public interest law firms and study 
groups. A good example, I think, is the conglomerate organized by 
Ralph Nader. I know Ralph Nader wouldn't like that description, but 
these organizations are new factors with which corporate lawyers ought 
to be prepared to deal. Finally, there are the new causes to which dissi- 
dent shareholders are giving voice. The example I have used is out of 
the Wall Street Journal of May third of this year. The headline says, 
"Dissident groups cause pandemonium at FMC meeting - firm's war 
goods, pesticides, phosphates attacked!" 
What is striking about that description, to me, is the variety and 
particularity of the substantive policies being attacked, compared to 
the battles for that general goal called "shareholder democracy" that 
Wilma Soss and Lewis Gilbert have waged for so many years, that 
we are so familiar with. Whether one agrees with Soss and Gilbert or 
not, it seems to me far easier for us in the United States - I don't 
know about the Germans and French - to make machinery more 
democratic, to accommodate the number and variety of different social 
demands being made on corporations today. But, it also seems to me 
important to note that it's not a new problem. 
Corporate law - and, I mean, the cases that we've got - has already 
had considerable experience in dealing with demands, not for democ- 
racy but for social responsibility. In 1919, the date of the decision by 
the Supreme Court of Michigan in Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, the 
earliest of my cases, the new voices in the United States were being 
raised, and not very loudly, not on behalf of shareholder democracy 
1. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). 
2. 260 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
3. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
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but on behalf of labor. Needless to say, those voices became consider- 
ably louder in the Thirties and Forties, and I think it also fair to say 
that, even if Walter Reuther didn't sit on the board of the Ford Motor 
Company, as he might have - as you have just heard, in some European 
companies, the Ford corporate machinery heard and heeded Walter 
Reuther's voice. 
But, what's more startling is that the voice raised on behalf of labor 
in the 1919 case was that of the original Henry Ford. The Ford Motor 
Company was being sued to compel the declaration of a dividend, and 
Henry Ford, who controlled the board of directors, had stated that no 
more special dividends would be declared at present and that the 
greater portion of the profit should be put back into the business in 
order to expand it, thereby increasing employment and selling a larger 
number of cars at lower prices per car. 
"My ambition," said Mr. Ford, "is to employ still more men, to 
spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible 
number, to help them build up their lives and their homes. To do this, 
we are putting the greatest share of our profit back in the business." 
Henry Ford lost the precise issue, in terms of which we have defined 
it as a new voice. On this issue, what the court held is that it is not 
within the lawful powers of the board of directors to shape and con- 
duct the affairs of the corporation for the merely incidental benefit of 
shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others. And, 
no one will contend that, if the avowed purpose of the defendant 
directors was to sacrifice the interest of the shareholders, it would not 
be the duty of the courts to infer that the "cakes and ale, they're for the 
company" - for shareholders - to quote our Chairman, especially 
given the post-1919 record of automobile sales in the United States. 
However, it seems clear, today, that Henry Ford's only mistake, in 
terms of this issue, was in not framing it in terms suggested by Mr. 
Lundborg, at lunch - long-term, rather than short-term profit max- 
imization. If he'd done that, he would have invoked the mantle of the 
business-judgement rule, and that would have protected him against 
shareholder action. 
The most recent case I mentioned - Medical Committee for Human 
Rights v. Securities and Exchange Commission - decided almost ex- 
actly a year ago by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, seems 
to me to cast serious doubt on the efficacy, today, in very many situa- 
tions, of the advice to Henry Ford that I have suggested, or Mr. Lund- 
borg suggested, at lunch - that of speaking in terms of long rather 
than short-term profit maximization and invoking the business-judge- 
ment rule in terms of long-term profit maximization. The fact is that 
the economic sophistication of today's new voices and specialness of 
management in discussing its position are both considerably greater 
than in the past. Thus, the brief of the Medical Committee in the Dis- 
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals, arguing that the SEC had erred 
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in raising no objection to the refusal of Dow Chemical Company to 
include in its proxy statement a resolution requesting the board of 
directors to consider the advisability of recommending a certificate of 
incorporation amendment prohibiting the company from producing 
napalm, cited corporate statements contained in the record to the effect 
that napalm contracts had little economic significance to Dow. There 
may be outstanding businessmen or scientists of the future who have 
been lost to Dow because of personal feelings on the matter; from a 
long-range viewpoint, we could be hurt in many ways. 
Secondly, in terms of the business-judgement rule, in denying that 
the proposed resolution dealt only with the sort of general political or 
social causes which have, historically, been excludable from corporate 
proxy statements under SEC rules, the court correctly held that the 
proposal relates totally to a matter that is completely within the ac- 
cepted sphere of corporate activity and control, saying: 
"No reason has been advanced in the present proceedings which 
leads to the conclusion that the management may properly place 
obstacles in the path of shareholders wishing to present to their co- 
owners, in accord with applicable state law, the question of 
whether they wish to have their assets used in a manner which 
they believe to be more socially responsible but possibly less 
profitable than that which is dictated by present company policy."4 
Now, you could object that the statement I have just quoted refers 
not to the business-judgement rule but to the corporate democracy 
that is the banner of those earlier new voices I have mentioned - Wilma 
Soss and Lewis Gilbert. It's a very valid objection in terms of the 
opinion, itself. In the paragraph immediately before the one I just 
quoted, the court, referring back to the statement about lack of eco- 
nomic significance and possible long-term profits, argued that the deci- 
sion to continue manufacturing and marketing napalm was made not 
because of business considerations but in spite of them, and it con- 
cluded that: 
"The proper political and social role of modern corporations is, 
of course, a matter of philosophical argument extending far 
beyond the scope of our present concern; the substantive wisdom 
or propriety of particular corporate political decisions is also 
completely irrelevant o the resolution of the present controversy. 
What is of immediate concern, however, is the question of whether 
the corporate proxy rules can be employed as a shield to isolate 
such managerial decisions from shareholder control. We think that 
there is a clear and compelling distinction between management's 
legitimate need for freedom to apply its expertise in matters of 
day-to-day business judgement, and management's patently il- 
4. 432F.2dat681. 
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legitimate claim of power to treat modern corporations with their 
vast resources ... [of personnel to act in] implementing personal, 
political, or moral predilections. It could scarcely be argued that 
management is more qualified or more entitled to make these kinds 
of decisions than the shareholders who are the true beneficial 
owners of the corporation; and it seems equally implausible that 
an application of the proxy rules which permitted such a result 
could be harmonized with the philosophy of corporate democracy 
which Congress embodied in Section 14 (a) of the Securities Ex- 
change Act of 1934."5 
The rhetoric - and, that is a quote from the opinion - makes ciear, 
I think, that the case was being presented as one involving corporate 
democracy rather than social responsibility. I disagree in particular 
with the Court of Appeal's statement hat the substantive wisdom or 
propriety of a particular corporate or political decision is also com- 
pletely irrelevant o the resolution of the present controversy. 
What I cite in support of that disagreement is the other case I men- 
tioned earlier - Sylvia Martin Foundation v. Swearingen. In that case, 
suit was brought against corporate directors seeking to hold them 
liable for having financed their company's expansion abroad by bor- 
rowing in Europe at interest rates higher than those imposed by Amer- 
ican lenders, and were borrowing that way solely for the purpose of 
alleviating the drain on the United States gold reserves. The complaint 
was dismissed on a variety of jurisdictional and procedural grounds. 
I will not bore you with a discussion of why I feel the decision on those 
issues might well have gone the other way. What seems to me signifi- 
cant is that, before entering judgement dismissing the complaint, the 
court went out of its way to say the following: 
"But had our decision on service been otherwise, the ultimate 
result would not have differed since, as a matter of law, the com- 
plaint does not plead a claim over which the Court would presume 
to act involving as it does an attack on a matter of business judge- 
ment and policy of defendant's directors in the management of 
corporate affairs for which, absent an allegation of fraud, personal 
profit or gain, the undisputed facts show complete justifica- 
tion."6 
And, you have heard all the undisputed facts in that brief descrip- 
tion I gave you of the case. But, the three cases I have discussed indi- 
cate, to me, in short, that the substantive wisdom or propriety of 
particular court or political decisions might well play a determinative 
part in court decisions involving proxy rules and shareholder deriva- 
tive suits, and corporate lawyers and directors must recognize that fact 
in offering advice and reaching decisions. 
5. Id. 
6. 260 F. Supp. at 235. 
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The primary difficulty in connection with the new voices in this re- 
gard, as I have indicated when I started, is the extraordinary variety 
of different social demands being made on corporations today. The es- 
sence of the matter, in other words, is that, in any corporation with an 
average number of shareholders, any particular corporate political 
decision may well have a loud set of new voices raised against it. 
What I hope my remarks have made clear is why, in the context 
of new voices, as in almost all areas of corporate law, I think it is a 
mistake to talk about "corporate machinery," as such, in connection 
with the problem of new voices, as I see it. For example, I think there 
are significant differences, depending upon the size of the corporation 
and the mode of its financing, in the extent to which competition - the 
market, in our luncheon speaker's phrase - can be relied upon to pro- 
vide the mechanism in terms of which new voices should be heard and 
heeded. To the extent that a corporation is dependent upon the con- 
sumers, the new voices are truly in control. The life of the corporation, 
again, as Mr. Lundborg pointed out, is dependent upon hearing and 
heeding them. Insofar as consumers are in control, moreover, there 
seems little need to limit the extent to which the business-judgement 
rule protects directors against shareholder attack, provided, only, there 
is sufficient deference to the norms of corporate democracy to permit 
stockholders to replace directors. 
Among the most important difficulties in assessing the extent to 
which a corporation fits into this category of consumer control is the 
nature of the category of the consumer. The fact is that new voices 
may be neither heard nor heeded, even assuming that a corporation 
does not possess sufficient financial or public-relations resources to 
ignore or manipulate them, provided, only, that the nature of the 
business be either sufficiently specialized so the profit or loss really 
depends upon the voice of only one customer, or diverse, so that no 
single set of consumers can have enough impact to be heard or heeded. 
For such a firm - and, I think many of the publicly-held corpora- 
tions fit into this category - I believe a variety of avenues ought to 
be explored. First, as the Medical Committee case makes clear, there 
is the possibility of greater utilization of mechanisms of corporate 
democracy that are already in existence. Second, as Leon Sullivan's 
election to the General Motors board of directors indicates, much can 
be done simply in terms of rethinking what views need representation 
on that board. Third, in many areas, there may well be a need for such 
corporations to utilize the machinery of government, which is far better 
designed to hear and heed new voices. By this last point, which goes 
very much against what Mr. Lundborg was saying, all I mean is that, 
if we take the task of hearing and heeding new voices seriously, many 
publicly-held corporations in many areas have a very real interest in 
being regulated by government, in having standards set for them and 
in abiding by and adhering to those standards, rather than having them 
diluted or diverted, or not having such standards - therefore being un- 
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able to live up to them without at least having a profit-and-loss state- 
ment, showing the fact that they are living up to the standard and their 
competitors are not. 
Finally, two points I'd like to make in connection with the role 
lawyers can play in regard to large corporations relatively free from 
consumer control to hear and heed new voices. First, there are the 
public-interest law firms - and, again, I think Ralph Nader is a good 
example - who, if they receive sufficient support may well, on many 
issues, bring to bear sufficient legal and public-relations techniques to 
force the corporation to hear and heed new voices. I have used "public- 
relations techniques" because I don't think that the public-interest law 
firms are going to win many issues at shareholder meetings, but I think, 
as public relations entities, they win many issues by making the di- 
rectors who have heard the debate vote differently, and the issue is 
settled in their favor. 
Second, at least where shareholder derivative actions or corporate 
democracy norms are at issue, there seem to me to be grounds to 
believe that the capacity of a lawyer - who is either an employee of the 
corporation or serves on the board of directors - to hear and heed new 
voices ought to be inspected. Again, if we take the task of hearing 
and heeding new voices seriously, I think that the role of either house 
counsel or director and counsel may well involve the disqualifying 
conflict of interest - which would not be disqualifying only if we didn't 
take the task of hearing and heeding new voices very seriously - and, 
I am not saying that we have to. I am saying, we seem to. 
MR. FARRELL: Thank you very much, Professor Deutsch. At 
breakfast his morning, when Jon alluded to this shift that's occurred 
in many areas, such as the law student no longer having to scratch and 
seek employment but the firm having to scratch and seek law students, 
I told him of a remark I heard recently from Paul Porter, in Washing- 
ton. Paul said he didn't mind the shift in emphasis in new burdens with 
respect to hiring students. What he objected to was, when they became 
associated with the firm, the only people they were interested in suing 
was the firm's clients! So, you get this boring-from-within problem. 
And, certainly, nobody in American business, I think, is better equipped 
to address himself to that question than the spy in our huddle, on my 
left, an economist urned business executive, and one with great cour- 
age, and we are all interested to hear from Mr. Bunting, who has some 
very interesting remarks to make and, I think, an announcement or 
two that will be of great interest o the audience. Mr. Bunting. 
MR. JOHN R. BUNTING: Thank you, very much. I am delighted 
to be here before this august body. I come as a representative of the 
rougher elements in commercial banking. They only recently let me 
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into the trust department, when I became chief executive. It's a real 
pleasure to deal with lawyers. I am accustomed to the tougher types. 
I am also delighted to have the opportunity on a day that gives me a 
forum for announcing something we have just released from the First 
Pennsylvania Corporation. That's Philadelphia's largest and the na- 
tion's oldest bank - ZVi billion in assets, and all that. We have an- 
nounced, today, the election of three new directors for our corporation. 
One is Henry G. Parks, who is a black gentleman and is the chief ex- 
ecutive of H. G. Parks Inc. You know it as "More Parks Sausages, 
Mom," a Baltimore-based firm. I venture to say that he is the out- 
standing black chief executive of a major corporation in the United 
States, and we are very pleased to have him join us. 
We also have Mrs. Joan Ganz Cooney to announce. Joan Cooney is 
obviously a woman, and she is the originator and an executive director 
of "Sesame Street," which has achieved some renown on national edu- 
cational television. 
We also announced the election of Harry Gangloff - and, if you said, 
"Who is he?" that's a good question. Mr. Gangloff is a Drexel graduate 
student. (Drexel is a university in Philadelphia.) He is going to sit on 
a special seat on the board that will be rotated among the three schools 
- Temple, Drexel, and Penn - and the students. He is twenty-four. 
And, while he has six years until he is an old man, we are only giving 
him three years in order to keep that seat moving. Of these three ap- 
pointments - at least one of them, the last one, I think, is relatively 
unique. I know of no other major corporation having a graduate stu- 
dent. By now, of course, a few of them have blacks and a few have 
women, but perhaps this is the first graduate student, the first person 
selected principally because he is young. 
As some of you know, I have spoken in the past about the need for 
new kinds of people on the boards of directors of large public corpora- 
tions. I derive my notion, in part, out of the role played by boards of 
directors. The legal role of directors is not at the crux of my argument 
so much as the role they actually play in board rooms across the coun- 
try. When I was with the Federal Reserve system for fourteen years, 
one of the things I did, as an economist, was tour the regions addressing 
board meetings of banks and other corporations to discuss the econ- 
omy, the business outlook, the Federal Reserve, and things of that sort. 
The board of directors would hear my talk and ask questions and then 
carry on their usual business. Typically, I'd stay through the meeting. 
I observed good boards, and some that were not as good. As I became 
an executive at First Pennsylvania, I assumed some board seats. My 
observations led to the conclusion that on any good public board the 
directors perform two roles, and only two roles. One, they appraise 
management. The most important role that directors have is to measure 
management, measure whether it's good against its competitors, mea- 
sure its worth to the community in which it operates, and measure it 
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subjectively and objectively in a variety of ways. And, secondly - the 
directors influence management by embodying attitudes and points of 
view. Management has to be sensitive to the directors, or you can put 
it the other way, more positively for the directors, and say that directors 
may influence management; but I think the influence here is a very 
subtle thing. I think those directors who try to help management man- 
age make a serious mistake, so that, by influencing management, they 
influence, not help, management to manage. 
This, of course, is not something with which everyone agrees. But 
it is an emerging idea that is being shared more widely as time passes. 
At the time I made my first statements nearly a year ago, they were 
picked up in the Wall Street Journal and discussed editorially in many 
other publications. Most - I think it's a fair statement o say nearly 
all - large corporate managements were being appraised and influenced 
by the same kinds of people. In other words, John Bunting is chief 
executive of First Pennsylvania and is a white Presbyterian, making 
in excess of a hundred thousand dollars a year, and was being evaluated 
and influenced by other white Presbyterians, or Episcopalians making 
in excess of a hundred thousand dollars a year. And, in the case of a 
bank, what is worse, in a sense, is that directors are often the biggest 
bank borrowers. Objectivity is not an easy thing. For directors of this 
ilk, true objectivity is really almost impossible. So I didn't think it was 
a totally healthy situation and I spoke about it. 
Corporations were anything but complementary about the sugges- 
tion that their boards were not representative enough to properly per- 
form their intended function. But the idea is resulting in some action. 
Someone mentioned Leon Sullivan, who is another Philadelphia^ and 
a very excellent one. He was recently elected to the board of General 
Motors, and I think things of this sort are beginning to happen. We 
can learn a great deal from our critics. When I first mentioned this 
idea, I got a letter from an irate stockholder who told me that he sold 
his hundred eighty-seven shares of First Pennsylvania Corporation 
stock because he didn't like this idea. He used a lot of language which 
was indicating that he really didn't like the idea of putting new types on 
the board, and told me exactly what type he was, and that was the type 
that should be on the board, and so forth and so on. I usually throw 
that kind of mail away. In this case, I wrote him a letter and said I was 
terribly sorry he'd sold our stock because, I was just as interested in 
having various shades of opinion among the stockholder group, and I 
was sure, in his case, he was irreplaceable! The amusing thing was, he 
never wrote me back - not even a comment, and I was a little dis- 
appointed. But, we have had many who are substantive critics. John 
Bunting is identified with modernizing his board of directors and, there- 
fore, our customers and other interested parties often discuss their 
views with me. I am criticized as doing something, in adding the three 
new directors, that is merely symbolic. There are a number of answers, 
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and certainly deeper ones than I will give for the moment here, but my 
answer, in part, is that the board itself is a symbol, so why should not 
the people on it be symbols? That is not an affront toany board. And 
if the board membership is already symbolic, why should we not just 
introduce new symbols to assist and augment? 
Symbols can be terribly important. Some years ago, long before I
had anything to do with it, The First Pennsylvania Bank was the first 
bank in Philadelphia to put a Jewish gentleman on its board, and, when 
a Jewish person first ook a seat on First Pennsylvania's board, I am 
sure it was largely for symbolic purposes and it could easily have been 
criticized. 
About two and a half years ago, First Pennsylvania Corporation, 
then a new one-bank holding company, wished to acquire a company. 
Because we were using our own stock to purchase the company the 
acquisition was going to mean, and did subsequently mean, that the 
president of the company that we were acquiring was going to be the 
largest single stockholder of First Pennsylvania. This, by the way, 
doesn't mean he is the dominant shareholder. First Pennsylvania stock 
is dispersed widely. The Jewish gentleman holds perhaps four percent 
of the outstanding stock. Nonetheless, the largest single stockholder in
First Pennsylvania was going to be the Jewish gentleman that owned 
the corporation we wanted to purchase. 
This went down a little hard with our directors. First Pennsylvania 
is the oldest bank in the United States, largest bank in Philadelphia, 
naturally; and this wasn't easy for some of them to absorb. But, at the 
board meetings, and the executive committee meetings, in some mea- 
sure at least because we already had Jewish representation o  the 
board, the ethnic issue was never discussed. A symbol helped us make 
an extremely important acquisition. Just how important is shown by 
First Pennsylvania profits in the first quarter this year. For the bank 
alone, earnings were up one-point-seven percent, approximately. The 
Corporation as a whole, including the bank and recent acquisition, was 
up fifteen percent. The other thirteen percent which swung the whole 
Corporation came mostly from that company that we purchased two 
and a half years ago, and from its Jewish chief executive. So that I say 
two things - the board, itself, is a symbol; and symbols can be impor- 
tant. 
There is a tendency to think that, because we are electing young 
people, blacks, and women to the board, that we are going to choose 
the wildest, stupidest people you could imagine among those groups; 
that we are going to put an African tribesman or a woman wrestler or 
a pot-smoking, needle-punching dope fiend on the board, as a youth, 
and some of the criticisms we get on this are just absurd. One reason 
we took so long to do what we did was, we wanted to make choices 
that would indicate the kind of people we wanted. 
Henry Parks (a black who is a black), is not, in the parlance they 
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use, an Uncle Tom of any sort. He was formerly a councilman in Balti- 
more. Mr. Parks feels so strongly about his blackness that he refused 
other board seats because he didn't think they wanted him for the right 
reasons. And he has warned us before coming on the board, that he is 
not going to lose his identity in joining the First Pennsylvania board. 
Mrs. Cooney is a modern woman in every sense. Her résumé lists a 
membership in NOW, the women's rights organization. But the reason 
Mrs. Cooney is on our board is her proven ability to cope with our 
business and urban society as a woman, without compromising that 
quality. 
The youth that we have, his hair isn't quite long enough to suit my 
fancy - I'd rather have a picture of a guy with hair down to there - 
but the fellow has all the rest of it. He cuts his hair; it's up to him. 
We wanted a little bit more symbolic a person, but he is excellent. He is 
going for a Ph.D. in engineering, and he is an ecology buff, and so forth, 
so that we have a real student. We are very interested in achieving 
better communications from the corporation and within the corpora- 
tion; and I suppose I could summarize my remarks by saying that we 
think these symbols, if that's all they are, are going to be extremely 
important symbols. Thank you. 
MR. FARRELL: Thank you very, very much, Mr. Bunting. That 
was a stimulating and very interesting set of remarks, and I think it's 
made a real contribution to our thought process here. 
The next gentleman we will be hearing from is certainly one of the 
most respected practitioners of corporate law, certainly in the domain 
of corporate counsel, to my knowledge. His contributions to literature 
in the area of the role of the corporate counsel in our society are 
legion and tremendously well known; and we have asked Leon Hick- 
man today to address himself to perhaps some of the little more specific 
and particular features of this question of the new voices which need 
to be recognized and the degree to which perhaps it may seem ap- 
propriate to do so. Mr. Hickman. ~- , 
^~~~ 
MR. LEON E. HICKMAN: Mr. Farrell, ladies and gentlemen, my 
experience is a little different than the other speakers and, conse- 
quently, my viewpoint on the problem is probably a little different, 
although I think we all recognize that none of us have the definitive 
answer. 
I think it has been well said about these new voices that we are 
being concerned about today - that seldom have so many complained 
so vociferously about so much. It ranges from the field of civil rights 
to war to the environment, o poverty, to women's liberation, to con- 
sumer protection, to population control, public transportation and the 
costs and quality of our schools; and these voices tend to agree on 
only one thing, and that is that the Establishment is to blame, and 
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that the Establishment, in its most visible components, is the govern- 
ment, the universities and the corporations - and we have seen these 
voices, perhaps aided and abetted by other things, bring down one 
national administration, bring about changes in administration at the 
University of California and Harvard, and various points in between. 
And, under the threat of the same dire consequence to our corporate 
structure, we are asked to orchestrate hose voices into some con- 
structive pattern. I do not, for the moment, quarrel with the fact that 
these voices must be heeded. I agreed entirely with what Mr. Lund- 
borg said, at lunchtime - that the corporation exists by public consent 
and that it must earn and re-earn its right to exist, every day. In a 
democracy, it cannot be otherwise. As we have seen it, historically, 
the public lost confidence in the railroads, and we got the Interstate 
Commerce Commission - a dire consequence, indeed! The securities 
market came into disfavor, and we got the securities legislation of 1933 
and 1934. And, more recently, truth-in-lending a d consumer-protec- 
tion legislation. It doesn't matter whether the corporations deserve 
what they got or not. When the public passes a judgement, that's 
final. 
So, I do not question, at all, that corporations, if they are to survive, 
must heed these new voices; but I do say, though, that they must not 
only heed them but must sort them out, because not all the new voices 
are going to be helpful. 
From What I know of corporate life, and I have been in it for 
some time, I think the corporations are heeding these new voices 
right now. The voice that they are hearing from the minority groups 
is that these men and women want jobs and want to earn a living, 
and, if these people are not qualified to hold down jobs, and good 
jobs, they want to be trained for the jobs. And the corporations have 
organized the National Alliance of Businessmen and have enrolled in 
it some twenty-seven thousand firms and have trained and put to work 
some two hundred sixty-five thousand hard-core, otherwise unem- 
ployed men. Now, that's just a drop in the bucket - -but, they are hear- 
ing that voice. 
These minorities want an equal share of the business of the cor- 
poration, whether it's bank deposits or subcontracts orwhat-not, and 
that is realized in the corporate councils that I know about. The con- 
sumer voice is demanding safety in the products and it's demanding 
an end to planned obsolescence, and I think that is pretty generally 
recognized; and I think the corporations today, without any new 
machinery, know what the environmentalists want. They want our 
air and our water to become pure once more, and they want noise to 
be abated to reasonable limits. And corporations are studying these 
environmental problems right now. The one I know best brought an 
eminent university president into its ranks as an officer and put 
him in charge of determining, through the research department, what 
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our environmental problems were and what it would cost to solve 
them. 
Ultimately, on the environmental issue, the corporations have got 
to wait for the statutory standards - otherwise, the corporation with 
a conscience and a concern about the environment will spend itself 
out of competition with its competitor who doesn't observe the same 
standard. So, there must be externally-imposed standards. 
Now, as I see it, there are three places in the corporate structure 
where these new voices are or could be heard. One is in the proxy 
statement; one is in the annual shareholders' meeting; and the other is 
on the board of directors. I would favor, very much, enlargement of 
the material made available to shareholders on the proxy statement. I 
think one great weakness in the corporate structure today is the fact 
that shareholders are as ineffective as they are in management of the 
business that they own, and, in part, that is because they are so numer- 
ous. Our businesses are owned by thirty million shareholders, and a 
company, not very large, can have ten, twenty, thirty or forty thousand 
shareholders; and it's very hard for those voices to be heard. 
I think we can and should improve what we do at the proxy level 
for our existing shareholders, the people who own the business. For 
example, it has been suggested that if any of them want to put up a 
nominee for the board other than those suggested by management, 
they should have the right to have that nominee and a biographical 
sketch about him submitted on the proxy statement so that the cost 
of that solicitation does not fall on the individual. And, just as man- 
agement nominees are presented at corporate xpense, in my judge- 
ment, so should nominees suggested by other shareholders. 
There should likewise be the fullest disclosure of information about 
the corporation's conduct. The financial information is already full - 
it is, perhaps, so full that many people pass it over as just too compli- 
cated to understand. Itshould be simplified. 
It is suggested that corporations should be asked to report to the 
shareholders on what they are doing in the field of environmental and 
employment policies and other public activities. I think that would be 
a step in the right direction. Itwould be hard to define. If you turned 
a corporation's public-relations department loose on defining what it's 
done in the public field, of course, it sweeps everything in. I don't 
know quite how you define your area, but I think the corporation's 
stockholders should know what is being done by the corporation in 
the public field. 
The only danger that I see^ or the most obvious danger I see, in 
what I am suggesting is that, with as many shareholders a we have, 
the proxies may become inordinately ong and complicated. I think 
it would be appropriate to require a shareholder to have a minimum 
number of shares before he could submit either a nominee or a ques- 
tion for shareholder action in the proxy statement. A candidate can't 
run for public office unless he gets a certain number of voters on his 
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petition, and this seems to me reasonable. Even in the recent General 
Motors fight, with all the publicity and promotion that it had, the 
shareholders presenting these new members got only two or three per- 
cent of the vote. 
Now, the influence, I quite agree, went way beyond the two or three 
percent, but there ought to be some cut-off. The owner of one share 
of stock or twelve shares of stock in a national corporation, I don't 
think, really has enough of a position - unless he gets the support of 
some other shareholders - but we should establish some reasonable, 
minimal level; and I think we ought to go much further than we ever 
have in making it possible for a shareholder to present his point of 
view, either on whom he wants as a board member or on other ap- 
propriate issues of the day, through the proxy statement. That's a 
matter that's being regulated and, as far as I can see, regulated well 
by the Securities Exchange Commission. 
The second place new voices can be heard is at the annual meeting, 
and often are heard there, very decidedly, indeed. The annual meeting 
is an anachronism from another day, when corporations were small 
and when the owners could really assemble. That isn't true anymore. 
Today, you couldn't get a hall big enough to get a representative se- 
lection of the shareholders present, if you hired the largest auditorium 
you know about. First of all, because of proxies, the votes have been 
already counted before the meeting is held. I really think that the an- 
nual shareholders' meeting is obsolete, as obsolete as the electoral 
college - and, it may sound revolutionary, but I can't think of any very 
good argument as to why it couldn't be abolished. 
If you could enlarge what you do by proxy, that's where the real 
action is. I think there would be something to be said for dropping 
the shareholders' meeting, particularly if it's going to become a forum 
for voices seeking to regulate the foreign policy of the United States 
ajid everything but the corporate business. But, even when they are 
on corporate business, you can't have in the room at one time more 
than a small fraction of your members. 
The third place new voices can be heard is on the board of di- 
rectors. And, with great deference, I would be very reluctant, per- 
sonally, to see us change the present system where directors represent 
the shareholders. What I say is not directed at what Mr. Bunting has 
done in his Philadelphia bank, but, when a black person is put on the 
Board as a symbol of being a black person, I ask, "Who chose him, 
whom does he represent?" I wonder if, perforce, he does not have to 
represent the black constituency, who are not shareholders, and, in- 
stead of the chief executive of the company being in charge of thè 
policy as to how many blacks are to be hired and where black depart- 
ment stores are to be made, I wonder if that director, perforce, due 
to the pressures on him from the outside, isn't required to take an 
independent position of his own. 
It has been my experience that most corporate executives that I 
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know are very well aware of today's problems, and I, for one, would 
trust he average chief executive I know, particularly if he's been a 
good general counsel before, to make the decisions as to how many 
blacks are to be employed and what is to be done at the various ocial 
levels. 
I have noted, for example, that the Reverend Leon Sullivan had 
to speak against his company at the stockholders' meeting, on the 
issue of doing business in South Africa. He simply couldn't have stayed 
on that board, if he'd supported management on that - I mean, his 
constituency, in my judgement, is not the shareholders, it's the black 
community, and he had to take that position. And, after he goes down 
to defeat on a half-dozen of those positions, I wonder what happens 
to the corporation when he resigns in disgust and says, "This cor- 
poration simply has me here as a symbol, and they don't mean busi- 
ness"? I question that, and I question whether - just to stay with the 
black community for a moment - whether they are as interested in 
a symbol, or even if it's more than a symbol, having someone in a 
position of power, as they are in how many people of that color are 
employed by that corporation, and where they are employed - some- 
thing that the chief executive could direct, without he intervention 
of a director for that purpose. 
I would also be fearful with somebody representing ot shareholders 
but a special interest like that. I would be fearful because we are deal- 
ing with a situation where we have a moving target. The situation is- 
and in most of these other issues, they are long-range public issues on 
which we, in typical American fashion, are demanding instant an- 
swers - that it's simply impossible to meet the standard - that is, the 
question is always going to be not, "What did you do for me, yester- 
day?" but "What are you going to do for me tomorrow?" I could well 
be wrong, but, in wanting to know how do you hear those voices, I, 
for one, would counsel getting in control the best chief executive you 
can have, and leaving the matter in his hands. 
If there are to be representatives in the corporate structure, I ques- 
tion whether the best place for them would not be as a vice president, 
reporting to the chief executive, where the line of authority was clear 
but where his voice could be heard. 
Now, I apologize for directing a sort of an argumentive note into 
the discussion, but I have genuine reservations on that point. And, 
with that, I conclude my remarks. 
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